Issues of Credibility in Motions for Summary Judgment in Idaho

The summary judgment motion is a fundamental juncture in the modern litigation process. Indeed, the summary judgment standard is so often encountered in case law that one can hardly blame themself for passing over its seemingly humdrum recitation while skimming a new judicial opinion. Afterall, the nuance and intrigue lie in how the standard applies to a unique set of facts, not in the standard itself, right? Well, if so, then the Idaho Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelso v. Applington, 548 P.3d 363 (Idaho 2024) is an outlier. 

We recently wrote about Kelso in Issue 2 of The Bullpen because the circumstances in that case illustrate the importance of comprehensive estate planning. However, Kelso deserves a second look, this time from the vantage point of a legal practitioner and in the context of the summary judgment standard. 

Practitioners are well-aware of the Idaho Supreme Court’s summary judgment standard: “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Summerfield v. St. Luke’s McCall, Ltd., 169 Idaho 221, 228, 494 P.3d 769, 776 (2021) (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(a)). However, what about when a case turns on the testimony presented by one witness and that witness’ credibility is reasonably in doubt? A similar factual circumstance was presented in Kelso. 

As described in the opinion, the ultimate legal dispute was over the ownership of checking account funds following the death of one of the joint owners (“Father”). Father was originally a joint owner with a right of survivorship of a checking account with his wife. After his wife died in 2017, Father’s friend (“Friend”) began helping Father process his monthly bills. In March 2018, Father executed a will leaving his entire estate to his son (“Son”). 

In May 2019, Father added Friend on his checking account as a joint owner with the right of survivorship. Sadly, Father died in 2020. Son, as personal representative and sole heir of Father’s estate, sought to have the checking account funds transferred to Father’s estate. Friend declined the request to transfer the funds into the estate and claimed ownership of the account under the right of survivorship. Son then sued Friend to invalidate the gift for lack of donative intent. Friend moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted.

On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that “[t]he central issue in this case is whether [Father] intended for [Friend] to receive the balance of the joint account on his death, or whether she was just added to the account for banking convenience in processing his monthly bills.” Kelso, 548 P.3d at 370. As evidence of Father’s intent, Friend relied on the testimony of a bank employee (“Employee”) who worked with Father to add Friend as a joint owner of Father’s account. Son argued that, although he had no direct evidence of Father’s intent, Friend’s and Employee’s deposition testimony conflicted on several key points, which called into question Employee’s credibility and created genuine issues of material fact that should have precluded summary judgment.

In the context of the summary judgment standard, the Court began by discussing the role of credibility in summary judgment determinations. The Court reviewed its first application of Rule 56 of the Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure in 1960 and reiterated its “long-standing summary judgment principle” that required denial of summary judgment “when there arises any question of credibility of a material witness[.]” Id. at 369–70. Accordingly, the Court explained that summary judgment should be denied “if the record demonstrates that the matter turns on the reasonably challenged credibility of a material witness’s testimony[.]” Id. at 370.

The Court then turned to the facts of the case and discussed three “key points” where Friend’s and Employee’s testimony conflicted. While the three points of divergence were not directly contrary to the direct evidence of Father’s donative intent, the testimony diverged on important circumstances surrounding how Friend was added to the account—including how the signature card that ultimately added Friend to the account was executed. Despite the lack of contrary direct evidence, the Court concluded that the inconsistency between Friend’s and Employee’s testimony on those three important, surrounding issues reasonably put Employee’s credibility as a general matter at issue. Because Employee’s testimony was the only evidence of Father’s donative intent, Employee’s credibility presented a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Friend and remanded for trial. 

Kelso illustrates how credibility can become a material issue for trial and preclude summary judgment. Notably, however, the Court undertook great care to emphasize that an issue of credibility precludes summary judgment only when credibility itself becomes a genuine issue of material fact. Inconsistent testimony involving inconsequential details alone falls short of precluding summary judgment. Id. at 373 (“‘[A]ny question of credibility’ should not be construed overbroadly, so that the slightest inconsistency on an inconsequential matter would preclude summary judgment.”). On the other hand, where “an inconsistency of material testimony reasonably calls into question a witness’s ability to perceive, recollect, or honestly present the facts related to material issues in the case, summary judgment should be denied.” Id.

Kelso is a reminder that credibility can play a crucial role at the summary judgment stage, particularly in cases where most, or all, of the material facts stem from a single witness. As such, movants must be cognizant that part of their burden on summary judgment involves showing the absence of a genuine dispute regarding the credibility of material witnesses. Nonmovants, in turn, may in appropriate cases be able to avoid summary adjudication by arguing that a reasonable trier of fact could simply reject the movant’s testimonial evidence on credibility grounds. Kelso, therefore, offers members of both the plaintiff and defense bars insights into litigation strategy at the summary judgment stage. 

Ultimately, as the Idaho Supreme Court has long held: “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Summerfield, 169 Idaho at 228, 494 P.3d at 776 (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(a)). However, credibility is also a critical consideration. As the Court has also consistently held: “Summary judgment is not proper where the depositions and affidavits raise any question as to the credibility of witnesses.” Kelso, 548 P.3d at 367-68 (quoting J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 615, 167 P.3d 748, 752 (2006)). Thus, “[w]here . . . an inconsistency of material testimony reasonably calls into question a witness’s ability to perceive, recollect, or honestly present the facts related to material issues in the case, summary judgment should be denied.” Id. at 373.

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